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1. Introduction 
 
Citizenship is a way of defining personhood which links rights and agency: ‘citizenship 
as rights enables people to act as agents’ (Lister, 1997).  It is consequently, a powerful 
word, with connotations of respect, rights and dignity. As Fraser and Gordon (1994) 
remark: ‘We find no pejorative uses.  It is a weighty, monumental, humanist word’. For 
all that, however, the history of citizenship has been one of terrible exclusions, stemming 
from the denial of respect, rights, dignity and even humanity by some groups to others. 
Indeed, from its earliest inception, citizenship has been as much about exclusion as 
inclusion. 
 
This paper explores these simultaneous processes of inclusion and exclusion as they have 
occurred in different places and at different times in order to understand better the vision 
of society, the material interests and the notions of identity which have helped to 
delineate different understandings of the concept.  This is no easy task. Even a 
preliminary reading of the vast literature on citizenship, spanning the experiences of 
ancient Athens, the Roman Empire, medieval Europe, the advanced industrialised 
countries, colonial and post-colonial states makes it clear that while the idea of 
citizenship is now nearly universal, ideas about citizenship are not - and never have been.  
 
The aim of this article is to contribute to the development of a research agenda on the 
theme of 'inclusive citizenship'. While it will touch briefly on the history of the concept, 
and its practice in different places and times, the main substance of the paper is 
concerned with some of the challenges it presents in the context of poorer southern 
countries today. A preliminary clarification on use of the term 'citizenship' in this paper is 
necessary. Conventionally, citizenship has been traced to the rise of the nation state and 
taken to refer to membership of the nation state and the formal duties and rights which 
membership carries (Shapiro, 2000). This understanding has been contested by those who 
point out that such membership may mean little to its members in contexts compared to 
other forms of affiliation with which they identify.  
 
However, my concern in this paper is with this formal notion of citizenship precisely in 
order to investigate the extent to which it meshes with, contradicts or is marginal to other 
forms of membership which may matter more. The concept of 'inclusive' citizenship is 
taken to refer both to people's ability to claim their legally recognised rights on an equal 
basis as well as to the extent to which that law deals with them in a way which guarantees 
their equality. Forms of exclusion and violations of rights which occur in the context of 
movements, or attempted movements, by people between nation states are an important 
topic in their own right and will not be touched on in this paper.  
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2. Citizenship and exclusion: a historical perspective 
 
From Athens to the Enlightenment: changing notions of citizenship 
 
In its earliest incarnation in the ancient city-state of Athens, the concept of citizenship 
implied a ‘community of equals’. However, the community in question was a highly 
bounded one. Only those men with the material means, personal breeding and leisure to 
perform their civic duties counted as citizens. Excluded were women and slaves whose 
domestic labours freed citizens to participate in public life. Citizenship in medieval 
Europe was also highly selective, confined to residents of the city who had freed 
themselves from feudal relations of servitude. Outside the city, feudal relationships, 
based on  ‘private-law’ identities such as serf, villein, vassal, lord and so on, continued to 
govern social life (Walzer, 1989). 
 
The ideas of the Enlightenment with its assertion of free will and individual conscience 
brought modern ideas about citizenship into existence. The French Revolution remains 
the most potent symbol of the struggle to establish a notion of citizenship based on civil 
and political rights against the claims of the feudal order: citizenship was to be ‘the 
dominant identity of every Frenchman against the alternative identities of religion, estate, 
family and region…[and] replace religious faith and familial loyalty as the central motive 
of virtuous conduct’ (Walzer, 1989: 211).  
 
While the Enlightenment provided the ideas which fuelled the struggle for citizenship, 
the dissolution of the older feudal order in the course of industrialisation and the rise of 
capitalism provided the material conditions under which it was finally won. In Britain, 
citizenship rights, initially limited to the nobility in their relations with the monarch, were 
gradually extended to new groups, first of all, the rising propertied middle class, and later 
to the rest of adult male population.   
 
As Marshall points out, the concept of citizenship was also made more inclusive through 
a broadening of the rights of the citizen to include social rights. While membership of 
village communities, towns and guilds had offered some degree of social security in the 
pre-industrial period, this had been eroded by the spread of capitalist market relations. 
However, the diminution of inequality which accompanied the growing prosperity of the 
entire society and the compression of t he economic distance between classes led to a 
growing demand for an abolition of inequality, at least with regard to the essentials of 
social welfare (Marshall, 1950:107).  
 
While Marshall's analysis of the evolution of ideas about citizenship remains one of the 
most insightful and widely-cited, it has also been recognised as partial and incomplete, 
even in the context he is dealing with.  The ‘history of citizenship’ he describes is, almost 
exclusively, that of the white, male working class in industrialising Britain. It is an 
account of a society without empire and without internal inequalities, save those of class 
(Fraser and Gordon, 1994: 93). It is silent on gender and race and on the rights of those 
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whose lands were colonised, whose way of life was disrupted and whose humanity 
denigrated by the imperial powers, including of course, Britain. 
  
A somewhat different account of rights and citizenship emerges in the context of the 
United States. While exclusion in the European context had been justified on the basis of 
the inherited feudal privilege, citizenship in America was guaranteed by a constitution 
which drew on the ideas of the social contract theorists, including that of the natural 
rights of ‘the people’. Exclusion could therefore not be treated as a taken-for-granted 
aspect of the social order; it had to be actively justified through the ascription of various 
forms of deficiency. When working class men were initially denied the status of citizen, it 
was on the basis of a presumed association between ‘prudence, probity and possessions’. 
Those without property, it was held, had no stake in the common good.  
 
Justifications for exclusion took on a more primordial form when they were bound up 
with socially-ascribed identities such as those of race and gender: 'nature had made 
women so weak as to require male protection and blacks so stunted that slavery was their 
true condition' (Sklar, 2000: 49). The denial of the vote to the black population on the 
basis of lesser intrinsic worth continued even after the abolition of slavery. While the 15th 
Amendment to the American constitution finally extended the suffrage to black men, a 
variety of ‘unruly practices’, including ‘grotesque registration requirements, literacy tests, 
poll taxes, grandfather clauses, white primaries, and more chicanery than they could 
possibly defeat’ (ibid: 55) served to subvert their political rights in the South for several 
decades thereafter.  
 
Women, black as well as white, continued to be denied civil and political rights long after 
the franchise had been extended to black men. The common law of coverture meant that 
married women did not exist legally as independent individuals but were placed under the 
‘cover’ of their husbands who, as head of household, represented them in the public 
domain. As a result, women could not own property or make contracts without their 
husbands’ consent and were denied free access to education and employment and custody 
over their children. It was not until the mid to late nineteenth century that women began 
to enjoy some measure of civil rights and not till the 20th century that they were given the 
franchise. 
 
Citizenship and empire  
 
The other telling silence in Marshall’s account of citizenship in Britain is on the rights of 
the colonised, an ironical omission in an era when Britain was the leading imperial 
power. Relationships between different imperial powers and their colonised subjects had 
obvious differences but also remarkable similarities. Mamdani's explanation for this is to 
the point: ‘the colonial state was in every instance a historical formation. Yet its structure 
everywhere came to share certain fundamental features ….because everywhere the 
organisation and reorganisation of the colonial state was a response to a central and 
overriding question: the native question. Briefly put, how can a tiny and foreign minority 
rule over an indigenous majority?’(Mamdani, 1996:16)  
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The colonial powers drew on a variety of sources, including their experiences and those 
of others. Hailey's discussion of a system of law for colonial Africa, for instance, draws 
on the experiences of imperial Rome as well as of the British in India: ‘Expressed in the 
briefest of terms, the chief problem of Rome was one of assimilation, and in this respect 
the Latin mind tended to  regard identity of legal rights as a more important element than 
the equality of political powers.  The problem of the British in India was primarily to find 
a system of law which would avoid emphasising the fact that the country was passing 
under the domination of a Power professing an alien faith’ (cited in Mamdani, 1996:49).  
 
It was, in the end, indirect rule, ‘association, rather than assimilation’, that became the 
hallmark of colonial rule. Even the French who began by granting citizenship to the 
inhabitants of their colonies soon found that native cultural assimilation led to ‘a 
resurgence, rather than a subordination’, of native political demands. They soon learnt the 
value of 'association'. However, as Mamdani points out, it was the British who were first 
to realise the ‘authoritarian possibilities in indigenous culture’ for attaining hegemonic 
domination of their subjects (ibid. ). They constructed the colonial edifice on pre-existing 
arrangements, institutions and identities, but in ways which promoted their goal of 
hegemony (Bose & Jalal, 1998). Customary law and traditional authority may have been 
invoked to support the hierarchical ordering of society, but the customs and traditions in 
question were largely ‘invented’ ones, re- interpretations and  reifications which served the 
imperial project. The history of colonial strategies in both India and Africa is testimony 
to this strategy. 
 
Prior to colonialism, both regions appear to have been characterised by considerable 
heterogeneity in economies and cultures, and matching assortments of political 
arrangements. In the absence of a central state, authority was dispersed within the 
community and legitimated by customs of caste, clan, kinship and so on. The colonial 
endeavour, in each region, was to codify, and in the process, to re-interpret and reify, 
customs and practices which had hitherto been fluid, shifting and capable of 
accommodating a diversity of local circumstances and needs. In each, the effect was to 
set up separate ‘communities’, each governed by its own customs and traditions, 
alongside a civil society, with a modicum of civil rights, in which selected representatives 
of the colonised groups interacted on unequal terms with the representatives of the 
colonial powers. In each context, political power was absorbed into the centralised state 
apparatus of colonial rule that replaced the diffuse and diversified political arrangements 
that had existed previously.  
 
In the Indian context, the British were able to use various classification and codification 
practices to construct economic, religious and caste categories which then became the 
basis on which they distributed differential patronage. The privatisation of land through 
the Permanent Settlement Act created a powerful landlord class loyal to British interests. 
In addition, British scholars and officials, with the aid of native ‘experts’, set about 
codifying the religious ‘laws’ of the different communities to provide the basis for 
governing their personal lives. These personal laws referred to those principles and 
practices which governed relationships within the private sphere of the family, covering 
such matters as marriage, divorce, maintenance, guardianship of children, adoption, 
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succession and inheritance.  They were seen as specific to, and separate for, different 
religious communities.  
 
However, the process of codification relied on the interpretations of a small privileged 
group within each religion, Koranic and Brahmanaical priests, scholars and clerics, who 
not only often disagreed with each other, but whose interpretations bore little relationship 
to the far more fluid and syncretic practices which had prevailed in local communities 
beyond the reach of the Mughal court (Bose & Jalal 1998, Mukhopadhyay 1998). In other 
words, ‘[w]hat British judges recognised as authentic was ‘sastric’ law in the case of 
Hindus and interpretation by a cadi in the case of Muslims’ (Menon, 1999).  
 
The adoption of religious law in the personal sphere was intended to placate conservative 
opinion within the different religious communities, and win their support for the colonial 
rulers. The British also adopted the principle of granting separate electorates to ‘majority’ 
and ‘minority’ religious communities in both local and provincial bodies. The effect of 
this was to solidify divisions along religious grounds, and to unify groups who were 
geographically and culturally dispersed, but shared a common religion.  
 
Caste was the other major category that became politicised during colonial rule. In 
principle, Hinduism acknowledges four main castes. In practice, these are sub-divided 
across the sub-continent into many thousand sub-castes. The lowest rung of the ladder 
within each local hierarchy is occupied by the untouchables, considered outside the caste 
system, and associated with the most stigmatised occupations within their societies. Just 
as the census enumerators had helped to establish the existence of supra-local categories 
organised along religious grounds, so the enumeration process also helped to construc t a 
supra-local ‘depressed’ or ‘exterior’ caste category.   
 
This had enormous implications, carving out an ideological space within which hitherto 
geographically scattered and culturally differentiated groups could be constituted as a 
legitimate social category on the basis of their shared subordinate status: ‘it was then a 
matter of political concession rather than ideological imagination to treat them as entitled 
to the kind of advantages bestowed on other groupings’ (Mendelsohn & Vicziany, 1998). 
The politicisation of this ascribed identity became evident in the demands of 
‘untouchable’ leaders that they be treated as a social minority comparable to the Muslims 
and provided with reserved seats in legislative bodies.  
 
By giving differences within the population far greater significance than they might have 
warranted, and constructing artificial and unstable unities, British authorities sought to 
pre-empt the possibility of a unified resistance to their rule. These differentiated 
categories became the basis on which political claims were made and recognised. When 
the British conceded first nominated, and later elected, representation by Indians to local 
legislative councils, the basis of representation was that of 'group', rather than 'individual' 
interests, initially of the landlord classes and later of religious and caste communities. 
And when the Indian National Congress fought for independence, 'liberty was understood 
not as an individual right, but as a nation's collective right to self-determination' 
(Khilnani, 1998). 
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The same divisive strategies were also in evidence in the very different context of sub-
Saharan Africa. Indeed, the earlier experience in India served to shape colonial rule in 
Africa: ‘European rule in Africa came to be defined by a single-minded and overriding 
emphasis on the customary. For in the development of a colonial customary law, India 
was really a half-way house.  Whereas in India, the core of customary law was limited to 
matters of personal law, in Africa it was stretched to include land…Just as matters like 
marriage and inheritance were said to be customarily governed, so procuring basic 
sustenance required getting customary access to communal land ...With this development, 
there was to be no exit for the African from the world of the customary’ (Mamdani, 
1996:50).   
 
One reason for this brief digression into the colonial construction of ‘community’ is that, 
however ‘imagined’ the boundaries that were constructed, and however ‘invented’ the 
customs and traditions that defined them, these became ‘real’ in the course of time. They 
were assimilated into the worldviews of their members and became the basis on which 
they acted politically.  And they continue to shape state-citizen relationships in the post-
colonial era.  
 
3. The materiality of citizenship 
 
The materiality of citizenship: the Western experience 
 
I have provided this rather truncated and selective history of citizenship, partly in order to 
understand what it means, and how it came about, but also to make the point that the 
diverse ways in which citizenship is thought about and practised in different times and 
different places is critically bound up with prevailing material realities and associated 
ideas about personhood.  In this section, I want to focus more specifically on these 
aspects in order to consider in very broad terms how they help to influence contemporary 
patterns of inclusion and exclusion. For the purposes of this analysis, I will limit myself 
to a somewhat stylised representation of these differences through a contrast of ‘Western’ 
and post-colonial experiences. 
 
The idea of citizenship as a way of defining the place of the individual in society evolved 
in the Western context as part of a series of changes which served to erode earlier 
definitions.1 In traditional pre-capitalist societies, claims to resources were generally 
grounded in variations of the ‘moral economy’, which served to keep individual self-
interest in check.  Social relationships were characteristically ‘quasi-permanent’, non-
voluntary and hierarchical arrangements which required subordinates to obey and super-
ordinates to protect. The disposition of property and other resources was based on a 
variety of relationships, including those of kin. Ownership tended to be a matter of 
divided and overlapping claims to various kinds of access and use, rather than of clear-
cut individual property rights. The extended notion of family gave a wide range of 
kinfolk as well as neighbours and villagers, some degree of economic responsibility for 
each other.  
                                                               
1 This account draws largely on Fraser and Gordon (1994). 
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Prevailing notions of personhood reflected these material realities.  ‘Relationally-defined 
statuses were cast as prior to, or contemporary with individuals and constitutive of their 
entitlements and obligations’ (Fraser & Gordon, 1994: 96).  There was no legal 
recognition of ‘individuals’ as bearing rights which preceded, and were independent of, 
their place in a status hierarchy: ‘it was an ontology that had room for masters and 
subjects, but no place for citizens’ (ibid). The emergence of the individual as citizen, a 
sovereign human being, equal to all others, subject only to the laws of the land and the 
forces of the market place, was a product of the ideas of the Enlightenment, with its focus 
on individual consciousness and free will, combined with the material transformations 
associated with the spread of market relations, the dissolution of landed privilege and the 
rise of a new, property-owning middle class.  Both sets of changes represented major 
challenges to pre-existing notions of  personhood.  
 
The privatisation of land, for instance, deprived the rural population of their customary 
rights of tenancy and use, but also freed them from customary obligations so that they 
could enter into contracts to sell their labour in the market place. The reform of 
traditional poor relief weakened established patterns of community support, further 
detaching labour from the support of kin and community. Civil rights expanded at the 
expense of customary claims and obligations.  Whereas previously all social relatio ns had 
been formed from, or modelled on, kinship, such relationships shrank in the course of 
industrialisation until they were confined to, and identified with the ‘private sphere’, the 
sphere of custom, norm and sentiment.  
 
Elsewhere in society, the expansion of generalised commodity exchange, and the 
emergence of the modern state, gave rise to an ‘impersonal’ public sphere, where the 
laws of the land and the forces of the market place prevailed.  Civil society, and the 
practice of citizenship, became part of this newly-delineated space where contract had 
replaced custom: ‘resources were exchanged for exact equivalents in discrete, monetised 
transactions between self- interested independent individuals’ (ibid.)  
 
As the model of the contract gained ascendance over a progressively larger share of 
human relations, the range of socially permissible alternatives gradually narrowed so that 
residual forms of exchange, those which were neither contractual nor familial, appeared 
unilateral and voluntary, entailing neither entitlement nor responsibility. Classified as 
charity, such exchanges positioned the giver as morally creditable and the recipient as 
stigmatised. This was the model of exchange which underpinned the reformed poor laws 
which provided a basic modicum of social assistance to those in need on condition they 
gave up their rights as citizens.  
 
However, the gradual extension of franchise beyond the propertied classes also gave rise 
to demands that labour not be treated as simply another ‘commodity’ and that the 
working man required a certain basic minimum of social security in order to exercise the 
full civil and political rights of citizenship. Whereas civil-political rights had promoted 
the ‘negative freedoms’ necessary for the pursuit of profit untrammelled by the 
constraints of custom, tradition and moral economy, a new set of social rights sought to 
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create the 'positive freedoms' necessary for those without property to participate fully as 
citizens. These did not rule out inequalities per se, but they did reduce inequalities in the 
capacity to act as citizens.  
 
It should be noted that this version of social rights largely emerged out of the social 
democratic traditions of the European states. As Fraser and Gordon point out, the greater 
individualism which characterised American culture offered little space for social rights 
and the implied obligations of individuals to contribute to the collective welfare.  
Nevertheless, the historical evidence tells us that the emergence of liberal notions of 
citizenship, premised on the model of free and equal citizens, took place in the context of 
a series of major material and ideological upheavals, the ‘great transformation’ described 
by Polanyi: the decline of feudal property relations, the rise of capitalist markets and the 
modern state, the growing individuation of ideas of personhood, the real and ideological 
separation of the different spheres of society, encapsulated in the separation of the 
‘public’ sphere of market, state and civil society and the ‘private’ sphere of family, 
kinship and community. These transformations were accompanied by the development of 
institutional machineries to uphold the emerging rule of law. Though discrimination in 
access to rights, resources and recognition on the basis of ascribed characteristics still 
continues in these countries, the principle of individual rights and equality before the law 
is one that has been firmly established and accepted. 
 
The materiality of citizenship: the post -colonial experience 
 
The experiences of the colonised countries form a marked contrast to this scenario.  Here 
the modern state was founded in the context of colonial rule and dedicated to its defence 
and prosperity rather than to the development of the local economy or social 
redistribution.  The practice of citizenship by the colonial powers at home bore very little 
relationship to their practice in their colonies. As a result, not only did they fail to 
challenge pre-existing hierarchies based on tradition, custom and ‘moral economy’, they 
actively strengthened and reified them through the defining powers of a modern state 
apparatus and a codified system of law. Consequently, colonised populations achieved 
national independence organised as religious, ethnic and tribal communities with 
immutable interests and collective rights, ‘apparently eternal and enduring elements of 
their societies’, rather than as individual and free citizens. 
 
Although it was hoped that independence would bring about an expansion in material 
prosperity and political freedoms, liberal notions of citizenship were not part and parcel 
of the struggle for independence. As Khilnani (1998) points out, the constitutional right 
to universal suffrage did not emerge from popular pressure within Indian society. It was 
upheld by a small intellectual elite who hoped that the different processes that had 
unfolded in slow sequence, often over centuries in the West, and which had formed the 
material conditions for their prosperity and freedoms could be condensed into a rapid 
simultaneity in India (ibid: 65).   
 
This did not happen. A modern state and universal franchise were put in place but the 
social and economic changes that had given rise to these political institutions in the West 
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occurred only unevenly. Limited success with industrialisation, the very gradual spread 
of market relations, the continued gulf between urban and rural life, the incapacity or 
unwillingness of the state to provide for the social welfare of the majority of its citizens, 
and its capture by powerful elites, all meant many of these pre-existing social 
relationships and the inequalities which they embodied, survived intact, or only 
marginally transformed, in the post- independence era.  
 
The idea of citizenship as rooted in an ontology of personhood which recognises 
individuals as bearing rights which are prior to, and independent of, their place in status 
hierarchies, still has only shallow roots in many of these societies. Relationally defined 
statuses continue to be cast as prior to individuals and hence constitutive of their 
entitlements and obligations. Kinship remains a central organising institution, structuring 
politics, religion, economy and social relationships, and rendering the distinction between 
public and private irrelevant.  Individuals continue to be classified in terms of their 
kinship roles and relationships and their place within the community. Where market 
relations spread, and the role of the state expanded, kinship may have been partially 
displaced from the centre of all social relationships, but the boundaries between public 
and private remained weak and fluid. And where the state remained weak and socio-
economic rights were either missing or had little relevance to major sections of society, 
kinship and community relations continued to provide the ‘anchor for security’ for 
individuals (Joseph, 1994). 
 
This is the situation that continues to prevail in many post-colonial states.  The adoption 
of certain formal rights, with neither the commitment to the obligations which correspond 
to these rights, or the institutional machinery which would give them substance, make 
such rights formal, rather than real, and enjoyed with varying degrees of certainty by the 
population.  The highly partial, incomplete and fragmented notions of citizenship which 
result often serve to reproduce, rather than disrupt, the socially ascribed statuses of 
kinship, religion, ethnicity, race, caste gender and so on in the public domain.  
 
 
It may be argued that these differentiated notions of citizenship resonate more closely 
with the cultural contexts in which they occur than do imported ideas of universal 
individual rights. They correspond to the hierarchies of affiliation which prevail and 
acknowledge the implications of diversity and difference in ways that are likely to be 
overlooked in more universalist notions of citizenship. On the other hand, and less 
positively, it can also be argued that differentiated notions of citizenship negate the very 
forms of agency that the idea of citizenship was intended to promote and to keep alive the 
very forms of inequality it was intended to negate. In the next section, I want to outline 
some of the different ways in which prevailing ideas about personhood, identity and 
affiliation fracture the rights of citizens and lead to exclusionary outcomes. These in turn 
suggest themes for research into inclusive citizenship. 
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4 Challenging citizenship 
 
Citizenship and political contestation 
 
Attempts to formulate citizenship rights and duties are fraught with difficulty in any 
context characterised by diversity. However, they are particularly fraught in post-colonial 
societies in which pre-existing differences within the population have been exacerbated 
or artificially suppressed by the strategic manoeuvrings of colonial powers. Attempts to 
address this problem through differentiated principles of citizenship which seek to 
balance local and national interests, individual and collective rights, have given rise to 
their own set of problems in the form of persisting conflicts of interests and loyalties. 
These may take ethnic, religious and other primordial forms, but they are essentially 
political conflicts about the nature and boundaries of citizenship.  
 
In Nigeria, citizenship is associated with a definition of indigeneity based on lineage. To 
be born and to have an entire working life in a particular state does not qualify an 
individual as an ‘indigene’ of that state.  Instead, they can only exercise certain 
citizenship rights, including election to public office in the ancestral home state, 
irrespective of the strength of ties retained with that home. The principle of 'autochthony' 
ignores the historical process of integration, inhibits any contemporary tendency towards 
integration and creates a situation of effective dual citizenship in many parts of the 
country, regardless of how long, and for how many generations the individuals may have 
been resident in the community to which they are not indigenous’ (Mustapha, 1997: 216).  
 
In Kenya, contested notions of citizenship illustrate the twin problems of defining the 
‘national interest’ and reconciling it with group interests. For the larger ethnic groups (the 
Kikuyu and Luo), a majoritarian electoral system offers control over the centralised 
apparatus of the post-colonial state and new opportunities for advancement. For the 
minority ethnic groups, however, this model of democracy consigns them to the status of 
a permanent minority. Their interests are better served through majimboism or 
regionalism, which would decentralise much of state power to autonomous regions - 
more or less ethnically-defined, colonial administrative units.   
 
In India, the intensification of majoritarian democratic politics has seen the erosion of the 
secular ideals of the constitution as a new generation of actors have entered the political 
stage defining themselves explicitly as members of religious communities. Indeed, as 
Khilnani points out, the very success of India’s democracy has engendered the menace of 
the tyranny of the religious majority, a threat traumatically manifested by the destruction 
of the Babri Masjid at Ayodhya by militant Hindu activists. Conflicts have also occurred 
along caste lines. While electoral politics has been gradually replacing  the ‘hierarchy of 
castes’ with a ‘democracy of castes’(Kaviraj, p. 104) in the  political arena at least, upper 
castes have waged war on those below them, often engaging in vicious atrocities on 
untouchable groups in regions like Bihar. Populist politics has also given rise to attempts 
to continuously extend the principle of affirmative action, embracing not only the 
scheduled castes but also other backward castes and even religious minorities, till in 
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almost every case, ‘the caste to which an individual belongs becomes a relevant factor in 
determining his entitlements’.  
 
 
Citizenship and social inequality  
 
A second problem of citizenship stems from definitions and practices associated with it 
which serve to reinforce, rather than eradicate, pre-existing forms of social inequality. 
The elevation of religious family to the status of public law, as in countries like Lebanon, 
India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, does not simply offer women different civil rights from 
men, but also, in contexts of religious diversity, differentiated between women - and men 
- from different religious communities. Moreover, as Joseph (1994) points out, it permits 
members of all social classes, religious and ethnic groups to transport the identities and 
affiliations of the private sphere of family, kinship and community into the public sphere 
of state and civil society. These identities and affiliations, rather than those prescribed by 
law, structure social life and public policy, shaping access to the considerable resources 
of the state.  
 
Such behaviour reproduces in the ‘public’ sphere, various forms of inequality which 
reflect the social relations of the ‘private’ sphere: 'the distinction between ‘elite’ and non-
elite kinship networks, between rich and poor families within the same kinship networks, 
between old and young within these families, and between men and women.  Resources 
are distributed on the basis of highly personalised, face-to-face relationships often 
grounded in real or idiomatic kinship, thus subsidising the control of male/elders over 
familial females/juniors/(poorer relatives….’(ibid.). As a result, citizens come to expect 
that demands of kin will take precedence over civil procedures and that their civic rights 
are conditional on the sets of relationships that they are able mobilise.  
 
Citizenship and economic dependency 
 
The third challenge to the practice of inclusive citizenship in poorer countries comes 
from poverty itself. In situations of extreme scarcity, the formal guarantee of rights is 
likely to be irrelevant since seeking redress for the violation of even the most basic of 
civil rights entails unaffordable costs. However, even the act of contemplating seeking 
legal redress suggests that a degree of agency has been exercised.  A different set of 
issues come into view in situations where the absence of the basic survival security 
impinges so severely on people’s agency that it undermines not only their ability to act as 
citizens, but even the possibility of contemplating such action. These contexts highlight 
not only the indivisibility of different kinds of rights but also the indivisibility of basic 
needs and basic rights.  
 
Where people lack the means to meet their daily survival needs, they will only achieve 
security of livelihoods by binding themselves into highly asymmetrical relationships, 
receiving a variety of resources essential for their basic needs in return for a variety of 
resources which reinforce their patron’s dominant status: political or factional support, 
muscle power in conflict, aid in emergencies, guaranteed supply of labour in peak periods 
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and so on. To understand how these economic relationships impinge on the basic rights 
of citizens, Smith (1997) points to the phenomenon of power by 'anticipated reaction'.  
 
The threat of withdrawal of support by patron households influences the behaviour of the 
dependent households in ways which are likely to have implications for their agency as 
citizens. Such power exists even where there is not clear evidence of attempts by the 
patron to limit the behaviour of dependent clients. The latter will still feel a pressure to 
act in what they believe to be the patron’s interests rather than their own, including 
through their voting behaviour, joining or forming associations, exercising freedom of 
expression. By undercutting the capacity of dependent groups to influence the processes 
by which their legitimate claims gain the status of formal rights and to participate in the 
processes by which these formal rights are made ‘real’, the existence of such 
vulnerabilities ‘undercut the development of any kind of reliable, grounded social 
practice of respect for human rights generally' (Smith, 1997:11).  
 
Citizenship and cultural devaluation 
 
The final challenge to 'inclusive' citizenship relates to issues of culture and identity.  
Citizenship is a particular way of defining personhood that is in contradistinction to 
definitions based on status within hierarchical social relationships. It seeks to replace 
claims based on norm, charity, benevolence or patronage with rights guaranteed by the 
state. As we noted in the opening quote, ‘citizenship as rights enables people to act as 
agents’ (Lister, 1997). However, the formal recognition of rights is not sufficient to turn 
people into agents. We have noted some of the 'external' constraints that prevent people 
from realising their rights as citizens. This section touches on others which are more 
'internal' in nature. They relate to the cultural valuations, including self-valuations, of 
different groups and their implications for their ability to act as citizens. As Lister points 
out, ‘to act as a citizen requires: first a sense of agency, the belief that one can act; acting 
as a citizen, especially collectively, in turn fosters that sense of agency. Thus agency is 
not simply about the capacity to choose and act but also about a conscious capacity 
which is important to the individual’s self- identity’ (ibid.38). In other words, to claim 
one's rights, there has to be a prior belief in one's right to have rights (Isin & Wood, 
1999). 
 
Citizenship and identity are thus intrinsically connected. Historical evidence tells us that 
when the rights of certain groups are routinely overlooked or violated and the groups 
themselves devalued, disparaged or invisibilised by the society in which they live, the 
denial of recognition can help to reinforce a lack of agency on their part. The importance 
of this mechanism was articulated over a century ago by Wendell Phillips in his 
arguments for the enfranchisement of black men in the US: ‘Men are so constituted that 
they derive their conviction of their own possibilities largely from the estimate formed of 
them by others.  If nothing is expected of a people, that people will find it difficult to 
contradict that expectation….’  
 
The arguments made by Stanton for the extension of the suffrage to women also invoked 
the connection between franchise and personhood: ‘To deny political equality is to rob 
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the ostracised of self- respect; of credit in the market place; of recompense in the world; 
of voice in (the choice) of those who make and administer the law; a choice in the jury 
before which they are tried, and in the judge who decides their punishment….Not to be 
heard is not to exist, to have no visibility and no place politically’ (p. 59).  
 
Socially hierarchical relationships, and the inequality of claims, entitlements and 
personhood which they embody, can be reproduced without a great deal of effort on the 
part of dominant groups if their dominance goes unquestioned. Unlike the strategic 
silence on the part of subordinate groups discussed in the previous section, the silence 
here reflects the absence of questions. The stirrings of a willingness to contest their 
devalued status on the part of subordinate groups marks the beginnings of their journey 
from subject to citizen.  
 
Towards inclusive citizenship: an agenda for research  
 
This paper has offered a broad-brush sketch of some of the factors behind the failure of 
'inclusive' citizenship in the specific contexts of the south. It makes clear that the 
constructing of more inclusive forms of citizenship is not amenable to the ‘quick-fix’ of 
policy recommendations. It is likely to entail forms of change that go beyond the domain 
of policy analysis and touch on changes in individual identity and consciousness as well 
as protests, movements and prolonged struggles. For the purposes of using research as a 
means of understanding how these changes are likely to occur, a number of themes 
emerge out of the analysis in this paper.  
 
¨ Institutions and access. The state, in its various manifestations, is clearly central in 
determining which needs and priorities are given the status of rights and in their 
operationalisation. However, beyond the state, a wider range of institutions, including 
those of the market and civil society, also contribute to the process through their 
recognition and respect for these rights. Although these are all in principle neutral 
arenas, in practice they tend to mirror and reproduce the social inequalities which 
prevail in a given context. This can occur through active discrimination or through 
unconscious biases. The result is that those that are marginalised within the wider 
society are also least likely to gain access on equal terms to the rights, resources and 
protection associated with the status of citizenship.   A study of the processes by 
which institutions responsible for both civil-political rights (courts, police, judiciary, 
political systems) and economic-social rights (state delivery systems, corporate 
entities, trade unions) give rise to patterns of inclusion and exclusion is clearly critical 
to an understanding of the dynamics of exclusionary citizenship. 
 
¨ Identity and agency: A second important theme relates to how excluded groups view 
their exclusion. How people define themselves, and are defined by others, is likely to 
be critical to their ability to exercise agency on their own behalf, including the agency 
needed to challenge their exclusion. To what extent do these definitions incorporate 
the ‘right to have rights’, the critical precondition for claiming rights? And where 
such self-recognition is absent or only weakly present, how is it brought into 
existence? Mendelsohn and Vicziany (1998) attribute an important role to education 
 14 
in promoting the political agency of dalits. They believe that access to education 
made an important different at the level of individua l identity: ‘Formally educated 
people tend to be different. Education engenders a kind of self-confidence… to invest 
a person with a sense of entitlement to equal treatment in matters of human concern’ 
(ibid: 263).  Elsewhere, however, it has been suggested that formal education 
reinforces a sense of devaluation and alienation through the promulgation of the 
dominant values of a society. Freire, for instance, observed that 'liberating education 
comes from acts of cognition, not transfers of information' (????). The various formal 
and informal, recognised and invisible, ways that excluded groups acquire knowledge 
and information about their status and rights and the capacity to reflect on their 
situation, to question it and act on it constitutes a common starting point in attempts 
to challenge exclusion. 
 
¨ Associations and collective action: Individuals can, and do, seek to challenge their 
exclusion from the status and practice of citizenship, but where exclusion is deeply-
entrenched, such action will have marginal impact. Historically, it has individuals 
acting collectively that has made most progress in redefining the boundaries of 
citizenship. Not all forms of group action operate in the political sphere, or in 
explicitly political ways, but they become ‘democratically relevant’ when they seek to 
contest relations of dominance in the sphere within which they operate (Jibrani, ????). 
Having a say in the way one is ruled is part of the process by which recognised 
procedures for participation and accountability are established. Where these are not 
established by those in authority, they have to be obtained through struggles ‘from 
below’. The third theme suggested by the analysis of this paper is the study of 
different forms of associations which seek to challenge the exclusions of citizenship 
in different contexts, the identities and interests which bind them together, the forms 
of collective action they engage in, what they achieve and the notion of personhood 
which they embody and promote.  
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